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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of cross-border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when
income varies across and within regions. We use a Salop model with a high-, middle-, and low-
income region. In each region, a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility
of its residents when health care costs are nanced by general income taxation. In equilibrium,
regions with higher income o¤er better quality, which creates an incentive for patient mobility
from lower- to higher-income regions. Assuming a prospective payment scheme based on DRG-
pricing, we nd that lower non-monetary (administrative) mobility costs have (i) no e¤ect on
quality or welfare in the high-income region; (ii) a negative e¤ect on quality but a positive e¤ect
on welfare for the middle-income region; and (iii) ambiguous e¤ects on quality and welfare for the
low-income region. Lower monetary mobility costs (copayments) might reduce welfare in both
the middle- and low-income region. Thus, health policies that stimulate cross-border patient
mobility can be counterproductive when regions di¤er in income.
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1 Introduction
Cross-border patient mobility is currently a key issue for health policy. In the European Union
(EU), patient mobility across member states has been high on the political agenda for many years,
despite the fact that the free movement principles do not apply to health care provision. A key
example is the new directive adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2011, which
gives patients the right to choose among health care providers across all EU member states.1 On
the 25th of October 2013, when the directive came into force, the Health Commissioner Tonio Borg
said:2
"Today is an important day for patients across the European Union. As of today, EU
law in force enshrines citizens right to go to another EU country for treatment and get
reimbursed for it (. . . ). For patients, this Directive means empowerment: greater choice
of healthcare, more information, easier recognition of prescriptions across-borders."
The actual patient ows across EU member states are small. In 2011, when the new directive was
implemented, the European Commission estimated the demand for cross-border health care to e10
billion, i.e., 1% of public health-care spending in the EU. In a recent Eurobarometer survey, only
5% of the respondents reported that they had received medical treatment in another EU country.3
However, according to the same survey, 49% said they would be willing to travel to another EU
country to receive medical treatment with the two main reasons being to receive treatment not
available in home country (71%) and to receive better quality treatment (53%). These gures
suggest a large potential for cross-border health care within the EU.
Cross-border patient mobility is also an important policy issue for countries with regional health-
care provision. Sweden implemented a free choice reform in 2003 that allowed patients to demand
health care outside their home county and ensured cost reimbursement by specifying transfer pay-
ments for cross-border care. A similar system is in place in Italy, where many patients migrate from
the south to the north to obtain better medical care. However, in Canada, patient mobility across
provinces is generally limited to emergency and sudden illness or allowed only in special circum-
1Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of
patients rights in cross-border healthcare.
2The full statement of the Health Commissioner can be found here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-932_en.htm
3The survey, Special Eurobarometer 425 Patients rights in crossborder healthcare in the Eu-
ropean Union, was conducted by TNS Opinion & Social for the European Commission in 2014;
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.
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stances. In the US, state-specic regulations restrict individuals from purchasing health insurance
outside their home state, which limits patient mobility across state lines.4
These real-world observations highlight the importance of understanding the e¤ects of cross-
border patient mobility. Would the new EU directive improve access to better health care for
patients, or is the reform benecial only for some countries while others are worse o¤? Would
cross-border patient mobility in the EU stimulate quality provision among member states, or can
the reform have adverse e¤ects on the quality of care? Should Canada do as Sweden and Italy by
allowing for patient mobility across regions, or are they better o¤ with the current system?
In this paper, we study the impact of cross-border patient mobility on health-care quality and
welfare, and discuss the implications for health policy. To do so, we develop a spatial model á la
Salop (1979) with three regions that di¤er in income distribution, i.e., a high-income, a middle-
income, and a low-income region. In the context of EU, we can interpret the high-income region as
Northern European countries, the middle-income region as the Southern European countries, and
the low-income region as the new member states in Eastern Europe.
The policy maker in each region chooses quality to maximise the utility of its own residents
subject to a budget constraint, where the total cost of health care provision is nanced by general
income taxation. To allow for income e¤ects, we assume individuals have decreasing marginal utility
of income, which implies that the marginal cost of raising tax revenues decreases with average
income. Consequently, health care quality is increasing in the regions income level, inducing
cross-border patient ows from poorer to richer regions. We focus on the equilibrium where the
high-income region only imports patients, the low-income region only exports patients, whereas the
middle-income region both exports and imports patients.
In the analysis, a key assumption is that the regions apply a prospective payment scheme
where the health care providers receive a xed price equal to the treatment cost per patient. This
payment scheme is consistent with Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) pricing that has been adopted
by almost every European country, and is now by far the most commonly used payment scheme
in the EU (Busse et al., 2011). As the treatment costs are arguably higher in richer regions with
better health care quality, DRG-pricing implies that the exporting regions are facing a net nancial
loss related to cross-border patient mobility, whereas the importing regions are fully compensated
4During the debate over Obamacare, the Republicans promoted an alternative approach that




for the treatment of migrating patients. Another key assumption is that we allow for the exporting
regions to possibly charge a copayment from the migrating patients to cover the di¤erence in the
treatment costs. This assumption is in line with the new EU directive that entitles patients that
demand cross-border care within the EU to cost reimbursement equal to that of their home country.5
Based on this framework, we derive a rich set of results regarding the regional e¤ects of cross-
border patient mobility on quality provision and welfare. First, a reduction in non-monetary mo-
bility costs (e.g., a simplication of administrative procedures) has no quality or welfare e¤ects in
the high-income region, since the costs of treating migrating patients are fully compensated. How-
ever, for the two other regions, a reduction in non-monetary mobility costs tends to reduce quality.
In both the middle-income and the low-income regions, the direct e¤ects of lower (non-monetary)
mobility costs on quality provision are unambiguously negative. Increased patient mobility reduces
the marginal benet of quality provision, because fewer patients will be treated in their home re-
gion. In addition, since patient export has monetary costs  both for the patients who migrate and
for the tax payers  higher mobility needs to be nanced by a higher income tax rate for exporting
regions. For the low-income region, we also identify an indirect e¤ect related to quality provision in
this region being a strategic substitute to the quality provision in the middle-income region, which
counteracts the direct e¤ects mentioned above.
Second, the e¤ects of reducing monetary costs of patient mobility (i.e., patient copayments) are
qualitatively similar to the e¤ects of reducing non-monetary costs. However, there is an additional
budget e¤ect that makes the overall e¤ect generally indeterminate. A lower copayment implies
that a larger share of the costs of patient export needs to be nanced by the exporting regions tax
payers, which in turn implies a tightening of the governments budget constraint. This gives the
exporting (low- and middle-income) regions an incentive to increase quality in order to mitigate
the increase in mobility caused by lower patient copayments.
Third, the e¤ects of cross-border health care on regional welfare are mixed with winners and
losers from such a policy. A reduction in non-monetary mobility costs has (i) no welfare e¤ect
in the high-income region, (ii) a positive welfare e¤ect in the middle-income region, and (iii) an
indeterminate welfare e¤ect in the low-income region. The middle-income region unambiguously
benets because of the cost reduction for the patients who seek treatment in the high-income region.
A similar e¤ect also applies to the low-income region. However, in this region there is a potentially
5See Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients rights in cross-border healthcare.
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counteracting welfare e¤ect due to the quality reduction in the middle-income region, which harms
the migrating patients but benets the tax payers. If, on the other hand, cross-border mobility is
stimulated by a reduction in monetary mobility costs (lower copayment), the welfare e¤ects in the
middle- and low-income regions are generally ambiguous.
Finally, we analyse the e¤ects of more income dispersion both across and within regions. Larger
inter-regional income inequality leads to higher quality in the high-income region, lower quality in
the middle-income region, whereas the e¤ect in the low-income region is ambiguous. The e¤ects of
higher intra-regional income inequality, on the other hand, depend on the region in which income
dispersion increases. Higher income inequality in the high-income region leads to higher quality
in that region and lower quality in the other two regions, while higher income inequality in either
the middle-income or the low-income region has no e¤ect on quality provision in the high-income
region and indeterminate e¤ects on the other two regions. Thus, allowing for cross-border patient
mobility can create negative spillover e¤ects of higher income inequality in the form of lower quality
of health care in neighbouring regions.
The literature on cross-border patient mobility is limited but growing.6 The recent papers by
Andritsos and Tang (2013, 2014) use a queueing framework to analyse the e¤ect of cross-border
patient mobility on waiting times and reimbursement policies.7 Andritsos and Tang (2013) nd
that patient mobility can increase patient welfare due to increased access to care. However, the
e¤ects on waiting times and reimbursement rates are mixed, and the additional costs of mobility
are disproportionately shared between the participating countries. Andritsos and Tang (2014) nd
that patient mobility can be benecial to public health-care systems (NHS), as health-care funders
can reduce their costs without increasing the patients waiting time. In border regions, where the
cost of crossing the border is low, outsourcing the high-cost countrys elective care services to the
low-cost country is a viable strategy from which both countries can benet. Despite similarities,
these studies do not consider the e¤ect of patient mobility on health-care quality nor the role of
di¤erences in income distribution across and within regions, which is the key focus of our paper.
The closest paper to ours is Brekke et al. (2014b) who consider a Hotelling model with two
regions that di¤er in health-care technology, where the region with more e¢cient technology o¤ers
6See, for instance, the review by Brekke et al. (2014a).
7There is also a paper by Petretto (2000) that looks at regionalisation of a National Health Service. It provides
conditions for establishing whether devolution for health care expenditure is desirable. Variations in health expen-
diture will depend on its marginal benet and the marginal cost of public funds, including higher or lower transfers
originating from mobility. However, this paper has no explicit spatial dimension and it is not concerned with the
quality of care. It is thus very di¤erent from ours.
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higher health-care quality and attracts patients from the region with less e¢cient technology. A
key nding is that the e¤ects of patient mobility depend on the transfer payment scheme. If the
transfer payment is below marginal cost, mobility leads to a race-to-the-bottom in quality and
lower welfare in both regions. Thus, patient mobility can have adverse e¤ects on quality provision
and welfare unless an appropriate transfer payment scheme is implemented.
In the current paper, we take a di¤erent approach by focusing on di¤erences in the income
distribution across regions as the key source of cross-border patient mobility.8 This is an issue that
has received much attention in the EU debate, especially after the recent extension of the EU to
Eastern Europe. To capture this, we therefore apply a model with three (rather than two) regions.
This also implies that the same region can be both importing and exporting patients, which cannot
arise with the two-region set up in Brekke et al. (2014b). Finally, we use more general cost functions,
allow for copayments when patients demand care outside their region, and allow for heterogeneity in
income within countries/regions (with richer patients more likely to move). Critically, we introduce
income e¤ects through decreasing marginal utility of income, which implies that qualities are in
most reasonable scenarios strategic substitutes, and this is an important driver of some key results.
We investigate the e¤ect of policy-relevant parameters such as patients copayments and inter-
and intra-regional income dispersion. Thus, our paper is signicantly di¤erent from Brekke et al.
(2014b).
Our paper also relates to the broader health economics literature on provider competition and
quality incentives. A key nding from this literature is that with regulated prices, competition
increases health-care quality if providers are prot-maximisers, whereas the relationship between
competition and quality is generally ambiguous if providers are (partly) altruistic.9 Despite some
similarities, our study di¤ers from this literature as we consider competition between regions (rather
than providers), where health-care quality is set by policy makers that maximise regional welfare
nanced through taxation. Moreover, the income distribution across and within regions is central
to our study, but not a part of the previously cited papers.10 Thus, the competitive mechanisms
in our model are clearly di¤erent from the more general literature on provider competition and
8Analytically, di¤erences in quality in the current paper are driven by di¤erences in income. In Brekke et al.
(2014b) countries di¤er in the marginal cost of quality, ie a country has a technology advantage.
9See for example Gravelle (1999), Gravelle and Sivey (2010), Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006), and Brekke,
Siciliani and Straume (2011). See Gaynor (2006) for an excellent review of the literature on competition and quality
in health care markets.
10There is a paper by Aiura and Sanjo (2010) that uses a Hotelling model with two regions that di¤er in their
population density to study incentives for health care quality. While this paper shares some similarities in the demand
structure, the focus is very di¤erent as they study the impact of privatisation of local public hospitals.
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quality incentives.11
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our model. Equilibrium
quality provision is derived and presented in Section 3, whereas, in Section 4, we describe the
strategic relationship between regional quality choices. In Section 5 we analyse the e¤ects of
policies to stimulate cross-border patient mobility  a reduction of either monetary or non-monetary
mobility costs  on regional quality provision and welfare. In Section 6 we explore the e¤ects of
(inter-regional or intra-regional) income inequality on regional quality provision and analyse how
these e¤ects depend on cross-border patient mobility. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a market for health care where patients are uniformly distributed on a circle with circum-
ference equal to 1 and the total patient mass normalised to 1. The market consists of three di¤erent
regions, which can be interpreted either as neighbouring countries or neighbouring regions within
the same country. The three regions, indexed by i = L;M;H, are of equal size, each covering 1/3
of the circle. The index i denotes whether the region has Low, Middle or High average income. The
market is served by three health care providers (hospitals), one in each region, where the provider
in Region i is located at xi. We assume that each provider is located at the center of its region,




6 ]. Each patient
demands one unit of health care (one treatment) from the most preferred provider. We assume
that health care provision is publicly funded through general income taxation and is free at the
point of consumption (at least for patients who seek treatment in their own region).12
The net utility of a patient located at z and receiving health care from the provider in Region
i, located at xi, is given by





11Our paper also relates to the economic literature on scal federalism and interregional competition, in particular
the part of this literature concerned with cross-border shopping. However, this literature is mainly concerned with
taxation rather than health-care quality as an incentive for cross-border mobility. See, for instance, Kanbur and Keen
(1993), Trandel (1994), Wang (1999), and Nielsen (2001).
12We therefore do not allow for the presence of a private sector alternative. Adding this additional choice would
make the presentation of the model much more complicated without gaining additional insights (see Barros and
Siciliani (2011) for a detailed review of the literature). Moreover, note that in our model patients may have to pay
a copayment when choosing treatment in a di¤erent region, which has some analogies with modelling public versus
private patients choice.
7
if the patient receives treatment in the region to which she resides. v > 0 is the patients gross
utility of being treated, qi  q is the quality o¤ered by the provider in Region i (with b > 0
measuring the marginal utility of quality)13 and t is the marginal disutility of travelling.14 The
utility of income is measured by a strictly concave utility function u (). We assume that patients
are heterogeneous in income yk with k = P;R and with yR > yP , i.e., we allow for high income
(Rich) and low income (Poor) patients. Assuming a proportional income tax rate (or social security
contribution),  i > 0, set by the government of Region i, the net income of a type-k patient in
Region i is given by
Y ki := y
k (1   i) : (2)
The proportion of high-income residents, i, is assumed to di¤er across regions, with H > M >
L > 0. For later reference, it is useful to dene the average gross income in Region i as
yi := iy
R + (1  i) y
P : (3)
We also dene the average utility gain of a marginal reduction in the income tax rate in Region i
(when all residents in the region seek treatment in their own region) as











The net utility of a patient located at z and receiving health care from the provider in a
neighbouring Region j (di¤erent from where the patient resides), located at xj , is given by





where F is a non-monetary mobility cost (disutility) of seeking care in a di¤erent region (because
of di¤erent administrative rules and language barriers, for example). We also assume that a patient
who receives care in a di¤erent region (with higher treatment costs) must pay a copayment , such
that the net income of a type-k patient in Region i who seeks care in a neighbouring region is given
13The lower bound q represents the lowest possible quality the providers can o¤er without being charged with
malpractice and is, for simplicity, set to 0.
14For tractability reasons, we make the standard assumption that utility is separable in quality, distance and
consumption. We also assume, without much loss of generality, that utility is linear in quality and distance. There
is strong empirical evidence showing that distance is a major predictor of patients choice of hospital, see, e.g., Tay
(2003) and Beckert et al (2012). We also assume that utility is separable in quality and consumption.
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by15
bY ki := yk(1   i)  : (6)
Assuming that each patient makes a utility-maximising choice of provider, and assuming that
v is su¢ciently large to ensure full market coverage in equilibrium, patients of type k who travel




































> 0 if  > 0. (8)
Because of decreasing marginal utility of income, richer patients have a lower disutility of paying
the copayment and are therefore more prone to choose cross-border health care (as long as  > 0).




ij + (1  i)
P
ij : (9)
Notice here that @ij=@qj =   (@ij=@qi) = b=2t.
Since utility is assumed to be strictly concave in income, the marginal cost of raising tax revenues
decreases with average income, implying that the optimally chosen health care quality will be higher
in richer regions (see section 3.2 and Appendix B). This creates an incentive for patient migration
from poorer to richer regions and we will look for an equilibrium that has this direction of patient












+ MH +LH : (12)
15The paremeter  could alternatively be interpreted as including other monetary costs of seeking cross-border
health care. This would have some minor implications for the way we specify the budget restriction of each region
(see Section 3) but would not qualitatively a¤ect the main results of our analysis.
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The provider in Region i is assumed to have the following the cost function:
C(Di; qi) = ciDi +K(qi); (13)
where K is increasing and strictly convex in quality, and where cH  cM  cL. We make the
simplifying assumption that quality costs are independent of the number of patients treated, im-
plying that quality can be characterised as a local public good at each hospital. A typical example
would be investment in medical machinery and other treatment specic hospital facilities whose
running cost, being mostly labour, is rather similar. We also make the assumption that marginal
treatment costs (might) di¤er across the three regions, where we postulate a positive relationship
between income level and treatment costs, motivated by the fact that labour (including health care
personnel) tends to be more expensive in high-income countries.
3 Optimal quality provision
The policy maker in each region chooses quality to maximise the utility of its own residents subject
to a budget constraint, where the total cost of health care provision is nanced by general income
taxation with a tax rate  i. For patients travelling from Region i to Region j to receive treatment,
the provider in Region j receives a payment pj per patient. We assume that part of this payment,
, is paid by the patient himself, whereas the remaining part, pj   , is paid by the tax payers
in Region i. As previously mentioned, we will consider an (interior solution) equilibrium in which
quality is highest in the high-income region and lowest in the low-income region. This implies that
the high-income region will attract (import) some patients, and the low-income region will export
some patients. The middle-income region both imports patients from the low-income region and
exports some patients to high-income region.
Let aggregate utility (i.e., total welfare) in Region i be denoted by Wi.
16 The problem of the
policy maker in Region i is then to maximise Wi with respect to qi, subject to a budget constraint.
We assume that this problem is well-behaved.17 The budget constraints in the high-, middle- and




= K (qH) +
cH
3
  (pH   cH) (LH +MH) ; (14)
16See Appendix A for the full welfare expressions for each region.





= K (qM ) +
cM
3




= K (qL) +
cL
3
+ (pH      cL) LH + (pM      cL) LM : (16)
The left-hand sides of (14)-(16) are the tax revenues collected. The rst term on the right hand
sides is the cost of quality provision, whereas the second term is the cost of treating all of the
regions own residents. The remaining terms are the net scal losses related to patient migration.
All else equal, if patient migration is protable for a particular region, a lower tax rate is needed to
nance a given quality provision. The high-income region only imports patients, and these patients
bring a net gain (loss) if pH > (<) cH . On the other hand, the low-income region only exports
patients, and this patient emigration has a positive (negative) e¤ect on the government budget if
pH + pM   2 < (>) 2cL. Finally, the middle-income region is both an exporter and importer of
patients. For this region, patient immigration is protable (unprotable) if pM > (<) cM , whereas
patient emigration is protable (unprotable) if pH    < (>) cM .
Notice that, as long as patient migration is not budget neutral, a change in quality provision in
one region will have budgetary e¤ects in all regions due to changes in patient ows across regions,
thereby a¤ecting the tax rates necessary to nance a given provision of health care.18 This will, in
turn, a¤ect the incentives for quality provision.
3.1 First-order conditions
We derive the rst-order condition for optimal quality provision in Region i by substituting the
budget constraint into the welfare function and maximising it with respect to quality. Thus, on











= 0; i = H;M;L: (17)
Using the expressions for welfare and the budgetary e¤ects of quality changes detailed in Appendix
A, we can characterise the optimal quality provision in each region more specically.















18See Appendix A for an explicit derivation of the e¤ects of quality provision on tax rates in each of the three
regions.
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The rst term is the marginal utility of health care quality in Region H: Notice that all patients
in Region H seek treatment in their own region and therefore all benet from an increase in qH .
The second term is the marginal cost of health care quality, which is the higher income tax rate
necessary to nance a marginal quality improvement, times the utility loss of higher taxes. Higher
quality will attract more patients from neighbouring regions. Thus, the amount of tax revenues that
need to be raised in order to nance higher health care quality depends partly on the protability
of treating such patients. If pH > (<) cH , less (more) tax revenues need to be raised when patient
immigration increases.

















































i = 0; (19)
where  L is dened by equation (A7) in Appendix A. The rst term in (19) is the marginal utility
of higher quality for patients in Region L. These benets accrue only to the patients who seek
treatment in their own region. Because of patient emigration, these are lower than the corresponding
marginal benets in the high-income region. The second term is the marginal cost of health care
quality, which is the utility loss of higher taxes. The second and third term in the square brackets
are the extra (per patient) utility loss of higher taxes for rich and poor patients, respectively, who
travel out of the region for treatment. If the copayment is positive ( > 0), the net income is
higher for patients who stay than for patients who go, implying an extra utility loss of higher taxes
(because of decreasing marginal utility of income) for patients who are treated in other regions.










































i = 0; (20)
where  M is dened by equation (A6) in Appendix A. The interpretation is equivalent to the








L) that solves the system
of equations given by (18)-(20). For the remainder of the analysis, we will assume that prices are
set equal to the marginal treatment costs, i.e., pH = cH and pM = cM . This is in line with current
DRG pricing in several countries where xed costs are not included in the tari¤. This is the case
in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland (Levaggi et al., 2014).19
Moreover, Levaggi et al. (2012) show that it is optimal to pay the provider based on a marginal cost
pricing rule and fund capital costs separately; otherwise the price is too high and undertreatment
arises.
We also make the realistic assumption that the patient copayment  is such that a patient
from Region j seeking treatment in Region i never pays more than the di¤erence between the price
charged by the importing region and the price reimbursed by the exporting region; i.e.,   ci  cj .
As mentioned in the Introduction, this is in line with the new EU directive. In Appendix B we
provide su¢cient conditions for the Nash equilibrium to exist under these assumptions.
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
The Nash equilibrium outcome is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1 (Figure 2) the blue
(red) dots on the circle indicate the location of rich (poor) patients who are indi¤erent between
seeking health care in their home region and being treated in the nearest neighbouring region. Total
migration is constituted by all patients (rich and poor) who are located on the intervals between
the dots (blue and red, respectively) and the nearest regional border (indicated by a blue square in
the gures). The relative positioning of the red and blue dots indicate that rich patients are more
prone to seek cross border health care. In other words, the share of rich people is higher among
the migrating patients than in the general population. Only in the special case of  = 0 do the red
and blue dots coincide on the circle.
19Other countries, such as Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, fund capital costs through the DRG price,
whereas other countries, such as France, Italy and Poland, use either one or the other pricing rule depending on the
treatment.
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4 Strategic interaction between regions
In order to understand the main mechanisms involved in the model, it is instructive to study the
nature of the strategic interaction between the di¤erent regions. In order to facilitate this analysis,
and the comparative statics analysis in the subsequent sections, we also make the additional sim-
plifying assumption of u000 () = 0, which implies that the marginal utility of income is decreasing











denote the di¤erence in the marginal utility of income for patients who move and pay a copayment
and those who do not. Under the assumption u000 () = 0, notice that uY is the same for all
individuals, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, and regardless of which region they move
from and to. Let












denote the expected degree of concavity (across individuals with di¤erent income) of utility with












denote the marginal utility of income due to a reduction in copayment; and, nally, let
eKM :=
K 0 (qM )  (pH      cM ) b=2t




K 0 (qL)  (pH + pM   2   2cL) b=2t
yL (1 +  L)
> 0 (25)
denote the marginal costs of quality in RegionM and Region L, respectively, adjusted for budgetary
e¤ects of patient migration.
If quality provision increases in one region, what is the optimal response by the policy maker in
a neighbouring region? This depends crucially on the direction of patient ow between these two
regions. Suppose that the patient ow in equilibrium is from Region j to Region i (which implies
that i = H;M , j = M;L, i 6= j). Our assumptions on prices and copayments imply that the
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budgetary e¤ects of quality provision (see the general expressions in Appendix A) are characterised
by @ j=@qi > 0 and @ i=@qj = 0. In other words, patient immigration is budget neutral for the
host region, while there is a negative budget e¤ect in the region from which patients emigrate, as
long as the migrating patients do not cover the entire di¤erence in treatment costs themselves. The
budget neutrality of patient immigration for the host region implies that d2Wi=dqidqj = 0; i.e.,
a quality increase in a patient-exporting region does not a¤ect the optimal quality provision in a
patient-importing region.
However, a quality increase in a host region will a¤ect the incentives for quality provision in
regions from which patients are emigrating. The policy response of Region j to a quality increase












































if j = L
3
2t if j =M
:
The optimal response can be decomposed into three di¤erent e¤ects: (i) a direct utility e¤ect, (ii)
an income e¤ect, and (iii) indirect e¤ects through the budget constraint. The rst two e¤ects are
unambiguously negative and the third e¤ect is also likely negative. Below we will explain each of
these three e¤ects in detail.
(i) An increase in quality of a neighbouring (patient-importing) region reduces the number
of patients who seek care in the home region. This reduces the marginal benet of the exporting
region to provide quality. This e¤ect is captured by the rst term in (26).
(ii) If patients who travel to a neighbouring region pay a copay ( > 0), their net income is
lower and the marginal utility from income higher, which e¤ectively increases the marginal cost of
providing quality in the exporting region. This e¤ect is captured by the rst term on the second
line of (26).
(iii) Since patient mobility is unprotable for the exporting region, which is the case for  <
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ci   cj , higher quality in a neighbouring region requires that more tax revenues need to be raised
in order to maintain the same level of quality provision (i.e., @ j=@qi > 0). This budget e¤ect
is captured by the sum of the terms including @ j=@qi in (26) and has one rst-order and two
second-order e¤ects on the incentives for quality provision. The rst-order e¤ect, given by the
last term in the square brackets of (26), is that the tax increase will increase the marginal cost of
quality provision (because of decreasing marginal utility of income). This e¤ect is dampened by
two second-order e¤ects (given by the two other terms in (26) that include @ j=@qi). Because of
copayments ( > 0), and since u00 () < 0, a higher tax rate will make it relatively more costly for
patients to travel out of the region, which dampens mobility and therefore increases (reduces) the
marginal benet (cost) of quality provision.
Thus, given that the two second-order e¤ects described above do not outweigh the rst-order
e¤ect, the third e¤ect reinforces the rst two e¤ects. We conduct the remainder of the analysis
under this highly likely assumption, implying that quality in an exporting region is a strategic
substitute to quality in an importing region; i.e., d2WM=dqMdqH < 0, d
2WL=dqLdqH < 0 and
d2WL=dqLdqM < 0.
5 Cross-border health care
In this section, we analyse how policies intended to increase cross-border patient mobility is likely
to a¤ect quality provision and social welfare in each of the three regions. We do so by conducting
comparative statics with respect to each of the two mobility cost parameters; the non-monetary
cost F and the monetary cost . A reduction in the patient copayment, , has a straightforward
policy interpretation, while a reduction in F can be interpreted as a policy to reduce the red tape
costs of seeking treatment in another region.
5.1 Administrative mobility costs
Suppose policymakers reduce the complexity of administrative procedures to obtain health care
in a di¤erent region, in order to encourage mobility. In our model, this policy corresponds to
a reduction in F . For given quality levels, lower non-monetary mobility costs increase patient
mobility and thus the demand for cross-border health care. How will this a¤ect regional health
16
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3 (cH + cM   2   2cL)
2tyL (1 +  L)
 0; (33)
and where M and L are dened by (A8) in Appendix A.
The quality of the high-income region is not a¤ected by lower non-monetary mobility costs,
since patient mobility is budget neutral and therefore has no implication for the tax rate in Region
H.
Health-care quality in middle-income region goes down when non-monetary mobility costs re-
duce. We identify three di¤erent e¤ects. For given quality levels, a lower F leads to less demand
for health care in the middle-income region and therefore lower marginal benet of quality in this
region. This e¤ect tends to reduce quality. More patient mobility also increases the number of
patients who have to pay a copayment, which reduces the marginal utility of income and tightens
the budget constraint. This e¤ect also tends to reduce quality. Finally, as long as  < cH   cM ,
migration of patients to the high-income region is costly for the government of the middle-income
region, implying that higher mobility increases the income tax rate (@M=@F < 0), which also
contributes to lower quality provision in Region M . Thus, the three direct e¤ects lead to lower
quality in the middle-income region, which in equilibrium reinforces the positive e¤ect on patient
17

























For the low-income region, there are direct e¤ects of a reduction in F , and an indirect e¤ect
through the strategic responses to quality changes in other regions. The direct e¤ects tend to reduce
quality and are equivalent to the ones described above for the middle-income region. However,
the indirect e¤ect tends to increase quality. As discussed in Section 3, qualities in the low- and
middle-income regions are strategic substitutes. Since the quality of the middle-income region
decreases in response to higher mobility, the indirect e¤ect induces the low-income region to increase







































Thus, the negative quality response in the middle-income region and the ambiguous quality response
in the low-income region makes the overall e¤ect on patient mobility out of the low-income region
indeterminate.
We summarise the above-described e¤ects as follows:
Proposition 1 A reduction in the non-monetary cost of mobility has no e¤ect on quality in the
high-income region and reduces quality in the middle-income region. The e¤ect on quality in the
low-income region is a priori indeterminate and depends on the sum of three di¤erent e¤ects: for
given quality levels, a reduction in F leads to (i) higher demand for cross-border health care and
(ii) higher total cost of health care, which is paid partly by migrating patients and partly by the
remaining tax payers in Region L. These two direct e¤ects, which contribute to lower quality
provision in Region L, are mitigated by the indirect e¤ect of (iii) lower quality in Region M , which
instigates a positive quality response from the low-income region.
18
5.2 Patient copayments
As an alternative to reducing non-monetary costs of mobility, suppose that policymakers stimulate
cross-border patient mobility by reducing patient copayments (or other monetary costs of mobility).
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2tMH + 3 (cH      cM )uM





2t (LH +LM ) + 3 (cH + cM   2   2cL)uL
2tyL (1 +  L)
< 0: (42)
For given quality levels, a reduction in  lowers the cost of seeking care in a di¤erent region and
therefore increases the demand for cross-border health care. However, di¤erently from a change in
non-monetary costs, a reduction in copayments also tightens the budget constraints of the middle-
20The results in this section would be qualitatively similar if we instead assume a cost-sharing system where a
patient from Region j seeking treatment in Region i pays ji = # (pi   pj) = # (ci   cj), where # 2 (0; 1). In such
a system, the special case # = 1 (which corresponds to  = ci   cj in the current model set-up) would imply that
cross-border patient mobility is budget neutral (i.e., @ i=@F = 0).
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and low-income regions: a smaller copayment increases the tax rate necessary to nance patient
mobility.
As before, the quality of the high-income region is not a¤ected by higher demand due to lower
, since patient mobility is budget neutral for Region H. Moreover, since no patients from the
high-income region moves to a di¤erent region, there are no copayments paid.
The e¤ect of a lower copayment in the middle-income region is qualitatively similar to a re-
duction in non-monetary costs F , and therefore tends to reduce quality. However, it contains one
additional e¤ect, given by the last term in (39). Since a lower copayment makes mobility more
expensive for the government in the middle-income region, this region has stronger incentives to
raise quality in order to limit migration to other regions: less expenses are now paid directly by
the patient and mobility has a stronger negative e¤ect on the governments nances. This e¤ect
could potentially reverse the e¤ect on the quality provision in the middle-income region: quality
may increase rather than decrease. The e¤ect on equilibrium patient ows from the middle-income

























A similar direct e¤ect of a copayment reduction, given by the last term in (40), can be identied
for the low-income region. However, the overall e¤ect on quality in the low-income region also
depends on an indirect e¤ect, namely the strategic response to quality changes in the middle-
income region. Suppose that the sum of the direct e¤ects are such that a copayment reduction
tends to reduce (increase) quality in the low- and middle-income region. Because of strategic
substitutability, the reduction (increase) in quality in the low-income region is attenuated by the
strategic response to the reduction (increase) of quality in the middle-income region, which  in
isolation  tends to increase (reduce) quality in the low-income region. The e¤ect on equilibrium








































The e¤ects of lower monetary mobility costs on regional quality provision are summarised as
follows:
Proposition 2 A reduction in patient copayments has no e¤ect on quality in the high-income
region. The e¤ect on quality in the low- and middle-income regions is a priori indeterminate and
depends on the following three direct e¤ects: for given quality levels, a reduction in  leads to (i)
higher demand for cross-border health care and (ii) higher total cost of health care, which is paid
partly by migrating patients and partly by the remaining tax payers in the exporting regions. These
two e¤ects, which contribute to lower quality provision in Regions L and M , are mitigated by the
fact that (iii) the cost of patient emigration increases, since domestic tax payers have to pay a
larger fraction of the higher treatment costs, which instigates a positive quality response from the
exporting regions. In addition, there is an indirect e¤ect on quality provision in Region L because
of the strategic response to quality changes in Region M .
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 reveals that a reduction of mobility costs might have
qualitatively di¤erent e¤ects on regional quality provision depending on whether these mobility
costs are monetary or non-monetary. More specically, whereas a reduction in non-monetary
mobility costs unambiguously leads to a quality reduction in the middle-income region, this might
not be the case if, instead, monetary mobility costs are reduced. In order to shed some more light
on this, and derive some explicit conditions under which lower monetary mobility costs will lead to
a quality increase in Region M , let us consider the following specic assumptions:




A3 u (Y ) = Y   2Y
2, with  > yR and  > 0.
Under these assumptions, the following result applies:21
Proposition 3 Suppose that A1-A3 hold. The following three conditions are then su¢cient for
a copayment reduction to increase equilibrium quality provision in the middle-income region: (i)
income inequality between rich and poor is su¢ciently small, (ii) the di¤erence in treatment costs
between the high- and middle-income regions is su¢ciently small, and (iii) the non-monetary mo-
bility cost F is su¢ciently high.
21See Appendix D for a formal proof.
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The above proposition conrms that a parameter set for which reduced monetary mobility
costs leads to higher quality provision in the middle-income region exists. If the three conditions
in Proposition 3 are satised, the rst two e¤ects detailed in Proposition 2 are su¢ciently small to
be outweighed by the third e¤ect.
If L is su¢ciently close to 1=2, similar conditions guarantee that the direct e¤ects of a lower
copayment are negative with respect to quality provision also in the low-income region. Thus, in
this case, if the indirect e¤ect is su¢ciently low (i.e., if the degree of strategic substitutability in
quality provision for the low- and middle-income regions is su¢ciently weak), a marginal reduction
in monetary (non-monetary) mobility costs leads to higher (lower) quality provision in both the
middle- and the low-income region.
5.3 Regional welfare
How does an increase in the demand for cross-border health care  because of lower monetary or
non-monetary mobility costs  a¤ect social welfare in each of the three regions? Before proceeding
to answer this question, it is instructive to consider some general characteristics of the welfare






L(x); x), where x is
the parameter of interest. Notice rst that, due to the envelope theorem, @W i =@q

i = 0. Moreover,
because of the assumption pi = ci, indirect welfare e¤ects in a particular region only come from
quality changes in neighbouring regions to which the region in question is exporting patients.









and are generally ambiguous. On the one hand, higher quality in Region i increases the utility of
the patients who travel from Region j (rst term in (45)). On the other hand, higher quality in
Region i increases patient export to this region, which  if  < ci cj  implies a higher tax burden
for the residents of Region j (second term in (45)).
5.3.1 Administrative mobility costs
Consider a reduction in F . For the high-income region the e¤ect is zero: there are no patients
moving from the high-income region to other regions, and mobility is budget neutral.
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=   (LH +LM ) : (47)
A reduction in F has three di¤erent e¤ects  two positive and one negative  on welfare in the low-
income region: (i) it directly reduces the cost for all patients who move, which has a positive welfare
e¤ect; it also leads to lower quality in Region M , which (ii) reduces utility for those patients who
travel to RegionM , but also (iii) implies a tax reduction because of less (costly) patient emigration
to the middle-income region.







=  MH < 0: (48)
Thus, lower costs of mobility has an unambiguously positive e¤ect on welfare in RegionM , because
of the cost reduction for those patients who travel to Region H for treatment.
Proposition 4 A reduction in the non-monetary cost of mobility has no e¤ect on welfare in the
high-income region and a positive welfare e¤ect in the middle-income region. The welfare e¤ect in
the low-income region is a priori indeterminate and depends on three (one direct and two indirect)
e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is positive: (i) lower costs for migrating patients. The indirect e¤ects are
caused by the quality reduction in Region M , which leads to (ii) lower taxes in Region L because of
the reduction in patient migration to Region M , and (iii) lower quality of health care for patients
who still migrate to Region M . The overall welfare e¤ect is positive if the rst two e¤ects outweigh
the third e¤ect, and vice versa.
These welfare results suggest that there might be both winners and losers from a policy of
facilitating cross-border patient mobility by reducing administrative costs, and that the potential
losers are patients and tax payers in the low-income region.
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5.3.2 Patient copayments
As for the case of non-monetary mobility costs, a reduction in the monetary cost  has no e¤ect
on welfare in the high-income region: there are no patients moving from the high-income region to
other regions, and mobility is budget neutral.
However, in contrast to the e¤ect of non-monetary mobility costs, the direct e¤ects of a copay-



















On the one hand, and similarly to a reduction in non-monetary mobility costs, a lower copayment
increases utility for those who move to a di¤erent region to obtain health care. On the other hand,
it increases the tax rate necessary to nance patient emigration.
In the middle-income region, the welfare e¤ect is given only by the direct e¤ect in (50), whereas












where the sign of the indirect e¤ect (because of strategic substitutability) is generally ambiguous.
Proposition 5 A reduction in patient copayments has no e¤ect on welfare in the high-income
region. In the low- and middle-income regions, the welfare e¤ect is a priori indeterminate and
depends on two counteracting direct e¤ects: a reduction in  leads to (i) lower costs for migrating
patients, but (ii) higher taxes necessary to nance patient export. In addition, the overall welfare
e¤ect in the low-income region is also determined by indirect e¤ects caused by quality changes in
Region M , as detailed in Proposition 4.
Similarly to the e¤ects on regional quality provision, Proposition 5 reveals that the e¤ect of
lower mobility costs on welfare in the middle-income region might crucially depend on whether
these costs are monetary or non-monetary. As in Section 5.2, we can further characterise the e¤ect
of lower monetary mobility costs by considering a specic parametric example:22
22See Appendix D for a formal proof.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that A1-A3 hold. For cH > cM , the following two conditions are then
su¢cient for a reduction in patient copayment to reduce welfare in the middle-income region: (i)
income inequality between rich and poor is su¢ciently small, (ii) the non-monetary mobility cost
F is su¢ciently large.
This proposition conrms the existence of a parameter set for which the welfare e¤ect of lower
mobility costs in the middle-income region qualitatively depends on whether these costs are mon-
etary or non-monetary. For this parameter set, the total utility gain of lower copayments for
migrating patients is outweighed by the corresponding increase in taxes for the remaining popu-
lation in Region M . If L is su¢ciently close to 1=2, a similar condition ensures that the direct
welfare e¤ects of lower patient copayments (cf. Proposition 5) are negative also in Region L.
Generally, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that a policy of stimulating cross-border patient mo-
bility might have adverse welfare e¤ects at regional level. When seen in conjunction, these two
propositions also suggest that such adverse e¤ects might be less likely if the policy implies a re-
duction in non-monetary, rather than monetary, mobility costs. For example, under the conditions
given by Proposition 6, and if the indirect e¤ect of quality in Region M on welfare in Region L
is su¢ciently small, a reduction in monetary (non-monetary) mobility costs will reduce (increase)
welfare in both the low- and the middle-income region.
6 Income inequality
In this section we exploit the structural richness of our model to analyse how regional quality
provision depends on the degree of income inequality  both across and within regions  when
patients have the option to seek treatment outside their own region.
6.1 Inter-regional income inequality
In order to study the e¤ects of inter-regional income inequality on regional quality provision, we
assume that H = M +  and L = M   , where  measures the degree of income dispersion
across regions. An increase in  has no e¤ect on the income distribution in the middle-income
region, increases the proportion of rich individuals in the high-income region and reduces it in the
low-income region.

















































where d2WH=dqHd > 0, while the sign of d
2WL=dqLd is indeterminate.
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As expected, increased inter-regional income inequality leads to higher quality provision in the
high-income region. The intuition is relatively simple and consists of two e¤ects. A higher income
implies that, for a given tax rate, the average expected marginal utility of income is lower, and the
tax rate necessary to nance health care is also lower. Both e¤ects reduce the marginal cost of
quality provision. There are no indirect e¤ects since the quality choice of the high-income region
is independent of qualities in other regions.
Since the middle-income region maintains the same average income, there are no direct e¤ects
on quality. However, since qualities are strategic substitutes, the increase in quality by the high-
income region triggers a reduction in quality for the middle-income region.
In the low-income region, there are several direct and indirect e¤ects. First, an increase in
dispersion reduces the average income in the low-income region, which tends to reduce quality due
to the higher tax rate and the higher marginal utility of income. Second, an increase in the share of
poor patients reduces overall mobility, which increases incentives to provide quality for two reasons:
(i) more patients benet from the quality investment and (ii) lower mobility reduces the tax rate
and therefore the marginal cost of quality provision. Finally, there are two indirect e¤ects going in
opposite direction: the increase (reduction) in quality in the high- (middle-) income region triggers
lower (higher) incentives for quality provision in the low-income region.
Proposition 7 An increase in inter-regional income inequality leads to higher quality in the high-
income region and lower quality in the middle-income region. The quality e¤ect in the low-income
region is a priori indeterminate because of two counteracting direct e¤ects: (i) lower average income,
which also leads to (ii) less demand for cross-border health care. The rst (second) e¤ect discourages
(encourages) quality provision. In addition, quality provision in the low-income region is also (iii)
23See Appendix C for explicit expressions.
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encouraged by the quality reduction in Region M and (iv) discouraged by the quality increase in
Region H.
6.2 Intra-regional income inequality
Let us nally consider how increased income inequality in a particular region a¤ects quality provi-
sion in the same and (potentially) other regions. We model income dispersion within Region i as
a mean-preserving spread  such that eyiR := yR + i and ey
i
P := yP  

1 i
. This denition implies




the rich. Income inequality is increased without a¤ecting average income.
The e¤ect of higher income dispersion in the high-income region on the same regions optimal
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 K 0 (qH)
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> 0: (56)
Higher income dispersion implies that the rich bear a larger share of the total tax burden. A tax
reduction will therefore benet the rich to a higher degree, which implies that the average utility
gain of a marginal tax reduction is lower. This, in turn, implies that the optimal tax rate, and
therefore the optimal quality provision, is higher. Given strategic substitutability between regions,
a higher income dispersion in the high-income region will then ultimately lead to lower quality in
the other two regions.
The e¤ect of higher income dispersion in the middle-income region on that regions quality






















































The sign of this expression is a priori ambiguous and depends on the sign of the expression in
the square brackets. The rst line in (58) is positive and is similar to the one given by (56) for
the high-income region. The second line is negative and therefore pulls in the opposite direction.
Although higher income dispersion does not a¤ect total patient export (for given quality levels),
it a¤ects the composition of the patients who choose to travel out of the region, with an increase
in the share of rich patients. Thus, higher income dispersion implies that a larger share of rich
patients have to pay a copayment  for health care abroad, which, all else equal, increases the
marginal utility of income for the rich (on average) and therefore counteracts the e¤ect of higher
income dispersion.
Finally, the own-region e¤ects of higher income dispersion in the low-income region are equiva-
lent to the ones of the middle-income region described above and therefore not explicitly presented.
The only qualitative di¤erence is that a change in quality provision in Region L has no spillover
e¤ects to other regions.
Proposition 8 Higher income inequality in Region H leads to higher quality in the high-income
region and lower quality in the middle- and low-income regions, whereas higher income inequality
in either Region M or Region L has no e¤ect on quality provision in the high-income region and
indeterminate e¤ects on quality in the low- and middle-income regions. This indeterminacy is
caused by two counteracting e¤ects: (i) rich people take a larger share of the total tax burden,
which stimulates quality provision, but (ii) rich people constitute a larger share of the migrating
patients, which counteracts the rst e¤ect. In addition, a quality increase (decrease) in Region M
will contribute to a quality decrease (increase) in Region L.
24Notice that uY and MH do not depend on  (i.e., higher income inequality increases the number of rich
patients and reduces the number of poor patients who travel out of the region to be treated, but the net e¤ect is




Cross-border patient mobility is an important issue across countries  as exemplied by the new
regulation in the EU  and across regions within countries with regional health-care provision, such
as Canada, Italy and Sweden. In this paper, we study the consequences of cross-border patient
mobility on the quality of health care and the corresponding regional welfare e¤ects. We develop a
Salop model with three regions; a high-income, a middle-income, and a low-income region. In each
region, health-care quality is set by a policy maker maximising regional welfare subject to health-
care costs being nanced by taxation. Since the marginal cost of taxation is decreasing in income
(due to decreasing marginal utility of income), health-care quality is increasing in the regions
income level. Thus, patient mobility occurs from lower-income regions with poorer health-care
quality to higher-income regions with better health-care quality.
We focus on the (interior) equilibrium where (i) the high-income region attracts patients from
both the low- and middle-income regions and (ii) the middle-income region attracts patients from
the low-income region. Protability of cross-border patient mobility depends on the transfer pay-
ment scheme and we assume DRG-pricing, where the importing region receives a price equal to
marginal treatment cost for migrating patients.
While our analysis produces a rich set of results regarding regional e¤ects of cross-border patient
mobility on quality provision and welfare, we would like to highlight three di¤erent results: First, an
increase in patient mobility driven by a reduction in non-monetary mobility costs has no e¤ect on
quality in the high-income region, but reduces quality in the middle-income and, if indirect e¤ects
are small, also reduces quality in the low-income region. Thus, and perhaps counter-intuitively,
patient mobility can have adverse e¤ects on the quality of care in lower-income regions exporting
patients to higher-income regions, and can therefore increase dispersion in health care quality
between high- and low-income regions. This result may explain the delay in the application of the
EU Directive in several member countries.25
Second, lower patient copayment for cross-border health care has no e¤ect on quality in the
high-income region, and has an indeterminate e¤ect on the quality in the low- and middle-income
regions. This result shows that whether increased cross-border patient mobility amplies or damp-
ens dispersion in health care quality across di¤erent countries might crucially depend on the exact
mechanism that stimulates mobility.
25Evaluative study on the crossborder Healthcare Directive (2011/24/EU) Final report 21 March 2015.
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Third, an increase in inter-regional income dispersion increases quality in the high-income re-
gion, reduces quality in the middle-income region, whereas the e¤ect on quality provision in the
low-income region is indeterminate. This result might assist in predicting the likely e¤ects of aus-
terity and the economic crisis, which has a¤ected EU Member States in a di¤erential way, and has
been highlighted in the recent change of wind in the decisions by the European Court of Justice
that has ruled against patients asking reimbursement for treatment abroad (Elchinov, Luca and
Petru)26, where patients were coming from countries with relatively lower income (i.e., Romania
and Bulgaria). The concern was that, as a result of mobility, quality may decrease for those pa-
tients who do not seek care abroad. In summary, the consequences and implications of cross-border
patient mobility are far from straightforward.
By way of concluding, we would like to highlight some limitations of our study. First, our results
are derived assuming DRG-pricing. While this is a widely used pricing scheme for hospital care in
most Western countries, di¤erent regions may bilaterally agree on a di¤erent way of pricing cross-
border care. However, there is still an underlying problem that a patient that is protable to treat
for the importing region might be unprotable for the exporting region to send. Clearly, designing
an optimal payment scheme for cross-border patients is a key challenge. For the derivation of some
results we also assume that the DRG price is equal to the treatment cost since this is what we
observe in most countries. Other countries set the DRG price above the treatment cost to allow for
xed costs and capital expenses.27 Under this scenario, even the high-income region would respond
to mobility by increasing quality to attract additional patients with positive prot margin. In
turn, this would generate additional e¤ects to the middle- and low-income regions on top of those
already identied in the current analysis, which depends on the degree of substitution in quality
across regions.28
Second, our analysis has focused on cross-border patient mobility induced by quality di¤erences
across regions. Another important reason for cross-border mobility is impaired access to health
care at home due to capacity constraints and long waiting lists. We could interpret waiting time
26ECJ judgment in Elchinov, C-173/09, EU:C:2010:581 (from the Bulgaria to Germany); ECJ order in Luca,
C-430/12, EU:C:2013:467 (from the Romania to Austria); ECJ judgment in Petru, C-268/13, EU:C:2014:2271 (from
Romania to Germany).
27An alternative justication for the price mark up to be positive is that the hospital engages in upcoding and
receives a price designed for example for patients with additional comorbidities while the patient has none or limited
ones. This would involve the explicit modelling of patients with di¤erent severity which is outside of the scope of the
current analysis.
28Such additional e¤ects are often indeterminate and bring limited additional insights into the behaviour of the
low- and middle-income country.
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as negative quality in our framework, implying that poorer regions have longer waiting times
than richer regions inducing patients to migrate to obtain quicker access to care. However, this
interpretation ignores capacity constraints. If the richer regions that import patients have excess
capacity, then our results would hold. However, if the richer regions have also capacity constrains,
then cross-border mobility has a direct adverse e¤ect on the quality (waiting time) of the patients
of the richer region, which is not captured by our model. One possible way to account for capacity
constraints is to allow for increasing marginal treatment costs. Under this assumption, most of our
results will hold as long as the regulated price (DRG-price) is set at the marginal treatment cost in
each region. If not, the analysis would be much more involved. We leave this for future research.
Third, in our positive analysis we treat the copayment as exogenous, and restrict its possible
values to be in line with the new EU directive which entitles migrating patients the right to receive
cost reimbursement only up to what they would have in their home country. Endogenising the
copayment would require a model that allows for uncertainty in the health status of the patient.
We assume that the patient has already fallen sick and the copayment has already been determined
in a previous stage. Adding a proper moral hazard set-up to our model is likely to be intractable.
We conjecture that, as suggested by standard insurance theory, the copayment will be determined
such that it trades o¤ the benets from insurance against the costs of overconsumption. We
restrict copayments to be between zero and the di¤erence in treatment costs. Zero copayments can
be justied from an equity perspective, and many countries of the NHS type set zero copayments
for elective care. Positive but low copayments are also consistent with low elasticity of demand for
elective care. The exploration of optimal copayments when patients can move across regions seems
an interesting venue for future research.
Finally, our analysis is mainly positive and we have not explicitly dened a rst best scenario.
Suppose for example that a super-regional entity maximises the welfare across the three regions
and sets quality in each region taking into account the marginal cost in each region but internalises
patients benets from other regions. The quality in the high-income region would then be higher
then the equilibrium quality level derived in our analysis, since, in our model, the policy maker in
the high-income region does not internalise the benets of patients from other regions. Similarly,
the quality in the other regions will generally di¤er from those derived in our model (depending
on the price for importing and exporting patients). A super-regional entity could then design an
optimal system of transfers which induces regions to internalise externalities from other regions.
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In practice, however, a super-regional entity like this is unlikely to have the authority to impose
such system of transfers.29 An alternative approach would be to calculate a cooperative solution to
our game and provide a Pareto-e¢cient solution which is constrained by the available instruments,
which we leave for future research.
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Appendix A: Further details of the welfare maximisation problems
Welfare expressions


























































































































































































































Budgetary e¤ects of quality provision
Using (14)-(16) in Section 3, the e¤ects of a unilateral quality increase in Region H on the income















3b (pH      ci)
2tyi (1 +  i)
; i = L;M; (A5)
where
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> 0; i = L;M: (A8)
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2tyL (1 +  L)
: (A11)










3b (pM   cM )











































































































































































K 00 (qM )





2 (pH   cM )





























































































































































i K 00 (qL)


















i K 00 (qL)
yL (1 +  L)
< 0:
37
From (A15) we see that the second-order condition for optimal quality provision in RegionH always
holds (as long as quality costs are strictly convex or the utility function is strictly concave). The
two other conditions hold if the quality cost function is su¢ciently convex or if the utility function
is su¢ciently concave.
Appendix B: Equilibrium existence




L and which is an interior solution where
some, but not all, of both rich and poor patients in each region travel to a neighbouring region











3 , where k = R;P . To derive the conditions for such an equilibrium
to exist, consider rst the special case where cH = cM = cL, which also implies  = 0. With the
assumption of marginal cost pricing, this further implies that patient migration is budget neutral






















































































it follows that cross-border mobility will reinforce the quality dispersion across the three regions.































It is straightforward to see that all these conditions hold if F is su¢ciently small and t su¢ciently
high. All the above conditions are derived for the case of cH = cM = cL, which implies  = 0.
Di¤erences in marginal treatment costs across the regions (and a positive patient copayment) will
a¤ect the marginal cost of quality provision in the middle- and low-income regions in an indeter-
minate way. For a given quality di¤erence, a positive copayment will also reduce the threshold
value of F below which an interior solution exists. However, by continuity, equilibrium existence is
guaranteed also for su¢ciently small treatment cost di¤erences across the regions.





is that marginal treatment cost di¤erences across regions are relatively small. This equilibrium is
an interior solution if F is su¢ciently low and t is su¢ciently large.
Appendix C: Comparative statics
Notice rst that our assumptions of pi = ci and u
000 () = 0 implies d2WH=dqHdqM = d
2WH=dqHdqL =


































dx = 0; (C1)
where d2WM=dqMdqH < 0, d
2WL=dqLdqH < 0 and d
2WL=dqLdqM < 0 (see eq. (26) in Section 4
































Since quality in the high-income region is independent of other qualities, there is only one direct
e¤ect and no indirect e¤ects.




































The rst term is the direct e¤ect of x on qM , while the second term the indirect e¤ect through a
quality change in the high-income region.



























































The expressions for d2WH=dqHd and d
2WL=dqLd from section 6.1 are given by
d2WH
dqHd







































































































































Proof of Proposition 3
A1 is interpreted as  being so small that we can, by continuity, evaluate the e¤ect of a marginal























A2 implies that yR = yM +  and yP = yM   , where is  some positive number. Using this



























A marginal increase of  reduces qM if the expression in (D2) is negative. The rst term is positive,
while the two terms in the square brackets have opposite signs. By visual inspection, the two positive
terms are dominated by the negative term if three conditions are satised: (i) the income inequality
between rich and poor (measured by ) is su¢ciently small, (ii) the non-monetary mobility cost F
is su¢ciently large (implying that MH is su¢ciently small) and (iii) the treatment cost di¤erence
cH   cM is su¢ciently small. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
A1 is interpreted as  being so small that we can, by continuity, evaluate the e¤ect of a marginal
change in  at  = 0. Applying A1-A3, using the denition of  given in the proof of Proposition


































































A marginal increase in  will increase welfare in Region M if the expression in (D4) is positive.
The rst term is negative while the second term is positive if  is su¢ciently small. Thus, for a
given value of cH   cM > 0, the expression is positive if two conditions are met: (i) F is su¢ciently
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